Reproduce DeFi hack incidents using Foundry.
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Notion: 101 root cause analysis of past DeFi hacked incidents
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- Lesson 1: Tools ( English | 中文 | Vietnamese | Korean | Spanish | 日本語 )
- Lesson 2: Warm up ( English | 中文 | Korean | Spanish | 日本語 )
- Lesson 3: Write Your Own PoC (Price Oracle Manipulation) ( English | 中文 | Korean | Spanish | 日本語 )
- Lesson 4: Write Your Own PoC (MEV Bot) ( English | 中文 | Korean | Spanish | 日本語 )
- Lesson 5: Rugpull Analysis ( English | 中文 | Spanish | 日本語 )
- Lesson 6: Write Your Own PoC (Reentrancy) ( English | 中文 | Spanish | 日本語 )
- Lesson 7: Hack Analysis: Nomad Bridge, August 2022 ( English | 中文 | Spanish | 日本語 )
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- EVM Chains - 0xD7d6215b4EF4b9B5f40baea48F41047Eb67a11D5
- Giveth
20261014 UNCXSmartTokenVesting
20261006 SetProtocol ETHMACOAPY
20260921 GaslessReservoirEnabler
20260625 OceanBPoolSideStaking
20260420 ThetanutsVaultShareRounding
20260419 AaveRebalancerCreditDelegation
20260407 SquidMulticallAllowanceDrain
20260331 WhalebitOracleManipulation
2025
20250725 WhereIsMyDragonTreasure
20250716 StrategyLlamaLendConvex
20250702 ActivePoolUrgentRedemption
20250509 Nalakuvara_LotteryTicket50
2024
20240703 UnverifiedContr_0x452E25
20240610 UwuLend - Price Manipulation
2023
20231201 UnverifiedContr_0x431abb
20230715 USDTStakingContract28
2022
20221024 MulticallWithoutCheck
20221011 Rabby Wallet SwapRouter
20220908 Ragnarok Online Invasion
20220701 Quixotic - Optimism NFT Marketplace
20220624 Harmony's Horizon Bridge
20220608 Optimism - Wintermute
20220430 Rari Capital/Fei Protocol
2021
Before 2020
Phalcon | Tx tracer | Cruise | Ethtx | Tenderly | eigenphi
ABI to interface | Get ABI for unverified contracts | ETH Calldata Decoder | ETHCMD - Guess ABI | Abi tools
Slowmist | Defillama | De.Fi | Rekt | Cryptosec | BlockSec | Telem
20261015 KolanHook - KolanHook settles its escrowed ETH buy-windows at the same Uniswap v4 pool's instantaneous spot price with no TWAP or bound and accept() is ungated once a window has expired, so the attacker flash-borrows 6.7 WETH from Balancer, swaps it to move the KLN spot, then calls accept() on two expired windows it does not own so _closeWindow() mispositions their escrowed ETH as single-sided liquidity around the manipulated price and runs an unbounded buyback, and reverses the swap back through that freshly placed ETH liquidity before repaying the loan for a 1.279453 ETH net gain
Lost: 1.279453 ETH net to the attacker EOA on Ethereum (surplus 1.279914429958618589 ETH after the 6.7 WETH Balancer flash loan is repaid, minus ~0.00046 ETH gas), draining KolanHook's full 2.309861 ETH of escrowed window funds
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-10/KolanHook_exp.sol --evm-version cancun -vvv20261014 UNCXSmartTokenVesting - VestingManager pools every deposit of a given token in one contract and release() pays a slice of the full contract balance over a global share count, release() debits that global count but leaves the position's deposited shares in place and cancel() then debits the same shares a second time, so the attacker flash-borrows each token, creates self-owned vestings whose tranches are already elapsed and so instantly releasable, releases and cancels soft helper vestings to shrink the share denominator while donating token straight into the pool to raise the balance, then releases a payout vesting against the corrupted denominator and inflated balance to over-withdraw the other vesters backing tokens across five ERC-20s
Lost: ~88-89K USD across five ERC-20s on Ethereum, retained after the per-token flash loans are repaid and each reproduced to the wei against the tx transfer logs (EDGEN 55,601,598.708417972560603048, ZC 9,055,847.637887682268154756, pepecoin 40,155.284285661160205717, LO0P 65,372.217059159993437512, PAAL 113,657.766933968), the working capital flash-borrowed per token from Uniswap V3 (EDGEN), Uniswap V2 (pepecoin, PAAL) and Uniswap V4 (ZC, LO0P) and repaid in the same leg
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-10/UNCXSmartTokenVesting_exp.sol --evm-version cancun -vvv20261009 BitBay - the UsdcDaiV4Vault _withdraw liquidity==0 branch pays the vault entire DAI and USDC balance to the caller with no share-weighted cap, and reposition() is permissionless once the tick is outside the narrow LP range, so the attacker deposits one wei for a single share, swaps the Uniswap v4 pool to push the tick onto tickUpper, calls reposition to recompute a position whose liquidity rounds to zero and leaves the pooled funds as raw balance, then redeems that one share to sweep the whole 14838 DAI pool
Lost: 14838.466608989135865711 DAI swept from the vault by a single 1-wei share on Polygon (reproduced to the wei against the on-chain Withdrawn amount), the attacker then unwound the drained DAI plus flash-loaned capital to a net ~14,813 USDC profit
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-10/BitBay_exp.sol --evm-version cancun -vvv20261008 X7Finance - X7Pioneer's claimRewards() adds the unaccounted ETH balance delta into totalRewards on every call but only refreshes lastETHBalance when claimable is non-zero, so calling it with an empty tokenIds array re-counts the same donated delta each time and inflates the per-token reward until a single owned NFT drains the whole pool, the ~26.96 ETH donation supplied by a flash loan and repaid from the drain
Lost: ~6.78 ETH to the attacker on Ethereum (attacker EOA balance rose 6.777538 ETH; this reconstruction nets 6.793749214542107991 ETH, the difference being the on-chain Aave flash-loan premium and gas, neither modeled); the single draining claimRewards([300]) pays 33.756919822234785023 ETH, matching the on-chain RewardsClaimed to the wei, with the ~26.96 ETH donation capital returned
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-10/X7Finance_exp.sol -vvv20261006 SetProtocol - a second RebalancingSetTokenV3 vault (ETHMACOAPY) hit by the same permissionless actualizeFee() divCeil rounding, the attacker issues the rebalancing set then donates the residual base set into the vault own backing so the zero-fee recompute bumps unitShares from 12253 to 12264, then redeems the same quantity for more collateral than was deposited, the ~116,000 WETH issue/redeem size supplied fee-free by an Aave-v3-fork flash loan
Lost: 4.047988247781965824 WETH to the attacker in the first tx (reproduced to the wei) on Ethereum; two independent EOAs drained the ETHMACOAPY rebalancing set across two txs two blocks apart for ~8.11 WETH total, this PoC reconstructs the first tx (0xb54c77dae4c5ff8664779bacfb56d75242f39005b0b7778109d2f9033b9e8fc2) only, the ~116,000 WETH working capital borrowed and repaid in the same tx via a zero-premium Aave-v3-fork flash loan
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-10/SetProtocolETHMACOAPY_exp.sol -vvv20261006 SetProtocol - actualizeFee() is permissionless and recomputes unitShares with a divCeil even when it mints zero fee, rounding the backing collateral per share up by one with no fee actually taken, so issuing the rebalancing set before the bump and redeeming the same quantity after returns more collateral than was deposited, the ~25,044 ETH issue/redeem size supplied fee-free by a Uniswap v4 native-ETH flash-accounting loan
Lost: 5.083725683631735476 ETH to the attacker (reconstructed, 0.011% over the 5.083148662083682304 ETH taken on-chain) on Ethereum; the collateral backing Set Protocol's RebalancingSetTokenV3 was skimmed through the per-share rounding surplus, the ~25,044 ETH issue/redeem working capital borrowed and repaid in the same tx via Uniswap v4 zero-fee flash accounting
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-10/SetProtocol_exp.sol --evm-version cancun -vvv20261006 MakerDAOFlipKeeper - the dormant ETH-A flip-keeper proxy's drain selector has no ds-auth check, so anyone can call it to make the keeper vat.hope() a caller-supplied worker and then deal its four undealt 2020 ETH-A auctions and flux/exit the freed 200 WETH of collateral out
Lost: exactly 200 ETH (200.000000000000000000 WETH, 0xad78ebc5ac6200000 wei, reproduced with zero variance) to a fresh attacker on Ethereum; the dormant keeper proxy's unprotected drain settled its four undealt 2020 ETH-A liquidation auctions (#1457-1460, 50 WETH each) and swept the freed collateral out - not a MakerDAO core bug, the keeper impl's drain selector simply omits the ds-auth modifier that the contract's other functions carry
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-10/MakerDAOFlipKeeper_exp.sol -vvv20261003 MALT - the MALT/DAI sLP runs its below-peg price recovery inside swap() before sending the output, pulling DAI from the Capital Source treasury into the pool, then checks its constant-product invariant against the final balances without separating the injected treasury DAI from the caller's own input, so a negligible 1 DAI swap is credited with thousands of injected DAI and releases a disproportionate MALT output
Lost: 13,440.581562307921517594 DAI net profit to the attacker (exactly reproduced) on Polygon; the Capital Source treasury was drained of 12,744.644506590589136718 DAI across two below-peg rebalance injections, the attacker paying just 1 DAI per exploit swap and arbitraging the extracted MALT out on QuickSwap - the ~$72K figure in the original alert does not match the on-chain reconstruction
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-10/MALT_exp.sol -vvv20261002 GoldPesa - the GPX V4 hook rebalances protocol liquidity inside beforeSwap via a burn and TAKE_PAIR that run in the attacker's own open PoolManager unlock, and never checks the PositionManager deltas are settled first, so an unsettled mint debt parked in the same unlock nets against the hook's burn credit and the attacker walks the freed USDC out
Lost: 114,999.999186 USDC (exactly reproduced) on Base; the GPX/USDC V4 pool's protocol liquidity was burned by the hook's own hourly rebalance, and its 148,868.602188 USDC burn credit was split by the shared-unlock delta bug - 33,868.603002 USDC reached the hook while 114,999.999186 USDC paid off the attacker's unsettled mint debt and then exited to the attacker, funded by a 175,000 USDC Morpho flash loan repaid in the same tx
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-10/GoldPesa_exp.sol --evm-version cancun -vvv20261001 FlashLoopAdapter - a Safe module authenticates its caller by asking that caller whether the module is enabled (self-attestation) and then makes an unconstrained call to a caller-supplied router, letting a fake Safe drive the adapter into draining real Safes that enabled it
Lost: 114.096151 WETH (~$305k, exactly reproduced) on Ethereum; two Safes that enabled the module as a victim were emptied - Safe #1 lost 1306.48 weETH of Aave collateral once its 1335.26 WETH debt was repaid, Safe #2 lost 6.426 weETH, all swapped to WETH via ODOS for the attacker's net
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-10/FlashLoopAdapter_exp.sol --evm-version cancun -vvv20260930 SKYDAO - sell-path controller burns the pair's SKYDAO and syncs before the net sell is credited, latching a near-zero reserve that a direct pair.swap drains for the pair's entire USDT
Lost: 59,914.12 USDT net to the attacker (exactly reproduced) on BNB Chain; the SKYDAO/USDT PancakeSwap V2 pair lost its entire 183,482.88 USDT reserve, drained by a direct pair.swap against the reserve the sell-path burn+sync latched to ~0
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/SKYDAO_exp.sol --evm-version cancun -vvv20260930 PositionManager - deposit values the vault's existing USDT at the manipulable PancakeSwap V3 spot price, so crashing the spot before depositing mints inflated shares that withdraw redeems in the same transaction
Lost: 32,080.604282 USDT (exactly reproduced) on BNB Chain; one atomic tx crashed the USDT/BTCB spot with an 8,000,000 USDT swap, then ran 24 deposit(1,000,000 USDT)/withdraw cycles to drain the vault's own PancakeSwap V3 position, the pool losing 32,096.098596 USDT
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/PositionManager_exp.sol -vvv20260930 MUS - deposit refunds a first-deposit bonus and also credits it as withdrawable allocation, so a single deposit-withdraw from a fresh address returns more ETH than deposited
Lost: ~0.400168 ETH per deposit-withdraw cycle (exactly reproduced) on Ethereum; the MUS pool's standing 5.335 ETH was drained to 0 across the attack block, reported campaign total ~$36.9k across many fresh addresses
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/MUS_exp.sol -vvv20260929 LPBonus - reserve inconsistency between reward accrual and LP withdrawal lets a manipulated MSN reserve inflate an LP reward claim
Lost: 92,607 USDT ($92.6k) on BNB Chain; one LP position claimed 1,442,165.713011 FIST against an accrual that funded ~940,041.612768 FIST, extracted by flash-swapping the MSN reserve down at accrual and back up at withdrawal
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/LPBonus_exp.sol -vvv20260926 DAOstack - permissionless newOrganization lets an attacker hijack an existing Reputation contract and drain the Avatar
Lost: 4.025 ETH (full Genesis Alpha treasury); attacker minted 20,000 REP against the victim's real Reputation contract (supply 9,738.6 to 29,738.6, ~67% majority after a 200 REP GenesisProtocol vote-cost burn) and used it to self-install as a full-permission scheme
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/DAOstack_exp.sol -vvvBSC_RPC=https://bsc-mainnet.public.blastapi.io forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-09/PancakeV3SwapHelper_exp.sol -vvv --evm-version shanghaihttps://bscscan.com/tx/0x70bc4ff8439f74d26d454a53e9a135ac3659a958aa3462218d0db7ed55cf5104
20260921 TheRedVillage - ungated PolygonTRVRouter forwardRequest relays an attacker-supplied upgradeTo through the router's _authorizeUpgrade role on the SeasonService UUPS proxy, installing a malicious implementation that uses the proxy's TRVZooKeeper roles to pull every player's approved WETH and sweep the vault
Lost: 31.426018474517367982 WETH (~$80.7K) swept from TRVZooKeeper on Polygon; 299 players with standing WETH approvals were pulled for 31.350379502001368 WETH and the vault's pre-existing 0.075638972516 WETH was swept with them, reproduced to the wei
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/TheRedVillage_exp.sol -vvvLost: 35,380.154566 USDC net (two byte-identical acceptOffer calls each paid out 35,486.935717 USDC from escrow; funded via a UniV2 flash swap, repaid 35,593.716868 USDC)
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/DoinGud_exp.sol -vvv20260921 GaslessReservoirEnabler - erc20WithTransfersAndExecute lets a whitelisted module run unvalidated transferFrom calldata
Lost: 8.72 WETH ($23.8K) across 466 victims with standing approvals to the Enabler; PoC reproduces 3 victims, 2.3546 WETH ($6.4K, ~27% of the WETH-leg loss)
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/GaslessReservoirEnabler_exp.sol -vvvGaslessReservoirEnabler_exp.sol
20260921 InternetToken - permissionless swapV3 with caller-supplied pool lets a fake callback mint INT arbitrarily
Lost: 764,145,702 INT + 5.846988 WETH (attacker minted 925.41M INT total, dumped 161.27M into the real INT/WETH pool for the WETH, reproduced to the wei)
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/InternetToken_exp.sol -vvvBSC_RPC=https://bsc-mainnet.public.blastapi.io forge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/Likwid_exp.sol -vvv20260916 Startale - transient storage init flag outlives the constructor and lets anyone reinitialize an ERC7579 account and drain it
Lost: 427.551160 USDC drained in this batch tx (32.555561 USDC reproduced across 3 of 23 victim accounts; ~$2,876 USDC+USDT aggregate across 41 known batches)
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/Startale_exp.sol -vvv20260916 Flamincome - permissionless Convex stakeFor inflates Strategy NAV and lets VaultYUSDT overpay on withdrawAll
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/Flamincome_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/PrimeFinance_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/Nimiq_exp.sol -vvv20260915 RsETHSafeModule - nested self-referential multicall authorization bypass drains Gnosis Safe via DELEGATECALL
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/RsETHSafeModule_exp.sol -vvv20260915 BonfireSwap - missing caller authorization lets anyone force-sell any approved holder's tokens
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/BonfireSwap_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/SpiralHookV2_exp.sol --evm-version cancun -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/YamFinance_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/ORB_exp.sol -vvv --evm-version cancun20260911 GDC - chained EOA bypass, liquidity misclassification, burn mismatch, and reentrant tax-free exit
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/GDC_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/EtherFiAtomicQueue_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/OMNI404_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/UnifiProtocol_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/BeatXswap_exp.sol -vvvLost: ~5.6 ETH (5.277 ETH realized in this PoC after slippage selling looted UNI/AAVE/MKR back to WETH)
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/EnsoFinance_exp.sol -vvv20260909 ZentraFinance - aToken burn safeguard clamps to zero, repayWithATokens clears debt without burning
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/ZentraFinance_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/OrderFactory_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/RouterDrain_exp.sol -vvv20260907 CozyFinance - unverified UMA Optimistic Oracle trigger enables unbacked protection-token redemption
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/CozyFinance_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/DHC_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/Reddio_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/SecuredFi_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-09/NotionalFinance_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-08/ReflexerGEB_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-08/FloatProtocol_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-08/BalancerV1BPool_exp.sol -vvvLost: ~$124.8K for this cbETH pool (1 of 7 pools hit by the same bug the same day, ~$775K aggregate)
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-08/AjnaFinance_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-08/CashCowCoin_exp.sol --evm-version cancun -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-08/EnjinCryptoItems_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-08/FHToken_exp.sol --evm-version cancun -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-08/ArrakisGUNI_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-08/TermFinance_exp.sol -vvvLost: 10,000,000 SAND minted unbacked (~$517,170 face value, one of 400+ repeated txs in an ongoing campaign)
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-08/SandboxOFT_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-08/AllbridgeCCTP_exp.sol --evm-version cancun -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-08/USM_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-08/UnistreetLaunchpad_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-08/StrongBlock_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-08/AIC_exp.sol -vvv20260802 MOKE - settle() tx.origin check lets any EOA latch a manipulated MOKE/USDT price, then claim() mints inflated MOKE against it
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-10/MOKE_exp.sol --evm-version prague -vvv20260716 CrowdRingCircle - sell-destroy path burns CRC out of the pair on any non-exempt sell, collapsing the reserve so a follow-up swap drains the pool's USDT
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-10/CrowdRingCircle_exp.sol -vvv20260716 PerpetualProtocol - v2 (Curie) unguarded OrderBook funding-growth update lets anyone poison cached funding, draining the Vault
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-10/PerpetualProtocol_exp.sol --evm-version cancun -vvvforge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-07/SummerFi_exp.sol -vvv --evm-version cancunhttps://etherscan.io/tx/0x0db528c44f23fc7fa4544684a2fab81096450a14aae8bc89f42cd0592d43da12
forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-07/edel-xstock_exp.sol -vvvhttps://x.com/TenArmorAlert/status/2072130807356129726
forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-06/Vault4626_exp.sol --evm-version shanghai -vvvhttps://x.com/DefimonAlerts/status/2071495744071086510
forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-06/AIDC_exp.sol -vvv --evm-version shanghaihttps://x.com/TenArmorAlert/status/2071415914948685892
forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-06/CookFinanceIssuance_exp.sol -vvv --evm-version shanghaihttps://x.com/DefimonAlerts/status/2071497001443770684
forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-06/LixirPermitDrain_exp.sol -vvvhttps://x.com/DefimonAlerts/status/2070362661691207935
forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-06/OceanBPoolSideStaking_exp.sol -vvvhttp://x.com/defimonalerts/status/2070362661540286735
forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-06/DLMC_exp.sol -vvv --evm-version cancunhttps://x.com/TenArmorAlert/status/2069957542109958498
forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-06/RoyalRoyalties_exp.sol -vvvhttps://x.com/TenArmorAlert/status/2069596801725002121
Lost: N/A (purely educational; worst-case impact would have been ~$2M, matching the separate vulnerability that actually drained the contracts)
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-06/AztecEscapeHatch_exp2.sol -vvvhttps://github.com/AztecProtocol/aztec-2.0
https://x.com/ivanbogatyy/status/2069159603942596830
forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-06/ATM_LP_Burn_exp.sol -vvv --evm-version shanghaihttps://x.com/TenArmorAlert/status/2068993748936151209
forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-06/OLPC_exp.sol --evm-version shanghai -vvvhttps://x.com/exvulsec/status/2068308334512365924
forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-06/JB_exp.sol -vvv --evm-version cancunhttps://x.com/audit_911/status/2067943961327763788
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-06/AztecEscapeHatch_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-06/WHALE_exp.sol -vvv --evm-version cancunhttps://x.com/audit_911/status/2067451654694412720
forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-06/LBP_exp.sol -vvv --evm-version cancunhttps://x.com/DefimonAlerts/status/2067329401977532429
forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-06/DIP_exp.sol -vvv --evm-version shanghaihttps://x.com/TenArmorAlert/status/2067059314519417163
forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-06/Thetanuts_exp.sol -vvvhttps://x.com/PeckShieldAlert/status/2066540451126190312
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-06/AztecConnect_exp.sol -vvvhttps://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/06/15/aztec-exploit-drains-2-19m-from-dormant-privacy-protocol/
forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-06/TOPBPool_exp.sol -vvvhttps://x.com/DefimonAlerts/status/2064616112822583505
forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-06/NovaBox_exp.sol --evm-version prague -vvvhttps://x.com/DefimonAlerts/status/2064616360466919793
forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-06/AmbientCrocSwapDex_exp.sol -vvvhttps://x.com/TenArmorAlert/status/2063816231023427861
forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-06/BOSS_exp.sol -vvv --evm-version shanghaihttps://x.com/audit_911/status/2063819348305985748
forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-06/DTXT_exp.sol -vvv --evm-version shanghaihttps://x.com/audit_911/status/2063793931138347015
forge test --contracts ./src/test/2026-06/AISOTHPresale_exp.sol -vvv --evm-version shanghaihttps://x.com/audit_911/status/2063565495073415618
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-06/BYToken_exp.sol -vvv20260604 ATM Token - Hidden transferFrom Auto-Swap Drain
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-06/ATM_exp.sol -vvvforge test --contracts src/test/2026-05/AROS_exp.sol -vvv --evm-version praguehttps://bscscan.com/tx/0xe89fe640ec5241edfca7d8dcae77a0a4270dee15e4bbd043fc60e393aabf41e1 https://x.com/TenArmorAlert/status/2061289921990570349
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-05/YSDAO_exp.sol -vvvhttps://bscscan.com/tx/0x91f26d96373bbec6a6a8517c7be995a739d65f20fed589d53bc47d8140f91907
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-05/LegendaryMoneyMonNft_exp.sol -vvvhttps://x.com/SlowMist_Team/status/2060205558687486441
forge test --contracts src/test/2026-05/DxSale_exp.sol -vvvhttps://crypto.news/dxsale-exploit-drains-7-3m-in-bnb-through-hidden-contract-backdoor/ https://x.com/Tahax1/status/1928169316736651568 https://x.com/CoinsultAudits/status/1928203831996297670